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Abstract—We study how to enable auctions in the big data
context to solve many upcoming data-based decision problems
in the near future. We consider the characteristics of the big
data including, but not limited to, velocity, volume, variety,
and veracity, and we believe any auction mechanism design in
the future should take the following factors into consideration:
1) generality (variety); 2) efficiency and scalability (velocity
and volume); 3) truthfulness and verifiability (veracity). In this
paper, we propose a privacy-preserving construction for auction
mechanism design in the big data, which prevents adversaries
from learning unnecessary information except those implied in
the valid output of the auction. More specifically, we considered
one of the most general form of the auction (to deal with the
variety), and greatly improved the the efficiency and scalability
by approximating the NP-hard problems and avoiding the design
based on garbled circuits (to deal with velocity and volume),
and finally prevented stakeholders from lying to each other for
their own benefit (to deal with the veracity). We achieve these
by introducing a novel privacy-preserving winner determination
algorithm and a novel payment mechanism. Additionally, we
further employ a blind signature scheme as a building block
to let bidders verify the authenticity of their payment reported
by the auctioneer. The comparison with peer work shows that
we improve the asymptotic performance of peer works’ overhead
from the exponential growth to a linear growth and from linear
growth to a logarithmic growth, which greatly improves the
scalability.
I. INTRODUCTION
Increasingly many decisions are made based on the data
because of the rich information hidden behind it, and more
and more data is being collected almost everywhere nowadays,
which will soon lead us to the big data era. Among many ‘V’s
characterizing the big data, we focus on the 4‘V’s in this paper:
variety, volume, velocity, and veracity. The starting point of
this research is the observation that various auction mecha-
nisms are adopted in different fields. Spectrum auction [1], [2],
cellular networks [3], ad hoc networks [4], cloud computing
[5], cognitive radio networks [6], [7], web advertisement [8],
and smart grids [9] are good examples. However, the large and
diverse pool of the information available for attackers in the
big data has increased the privacy concerns [10]–[12], and we
present how to enable auctions in the big data context with
4Vs without privacy implications.
A. Variety
Different types of information is available from different
sources for different parties in the big data, and the auctions
may involve different types of goods. Existing solutions [13]–
[18] only deal with single-good auctions and thus lack general
applicability in the big data context. To deal with such a
variety in the big data, we target at a more general form of the
auction than the simple ones which sell only one good at each
auction – Combinatorial Auction (CA hereafter). In a single-
auctioneer CA, the auctioneer sells multiple heterogeneous
goods simultaneously, and bidders bid on any combination
of the goods instead of just one. Such auctions have been
researched extensively recently [19]–[22], in part due to the
generality of it, and in part due to growing applications in
which combinatorial bidding is necessary [23]–[26].
As further discussed in the following sections, the consider-
ation of the combinatorial auction will bring great challenges
to the auction design because of its inherent complexity.
B. Velocity and Volume
The velocity at which data is generated is at the different
order of magnitude in the big data from the one in the
traditional data, which pushed the volume of the processed
data beyond PB, EB, and even ZB (109 TB) [27]. The velocity
and the volume in the big data brings great challenges into
the realization of the privacy-preserving auction design in the
following two aspects.
Firstly, an early work [28] relies on the secure multi-
party computation using garbled circuits [29] and oblivious
transfers [30] to solve the CA in a privacy-preserving man-
ner. Such works protect the private information due to the
powerful secure multi-party computation, but the circuit size
grows very fast w.r.t. the CA parameters (number of bidders,
range of the bid value, maximum bid, number of goods)
which leads to non-polynomial time computation time. Also,
the oblivious transfer required for every gate in the circuit
introduces a huge communication time as well. Therefore,
the works based on garbled circuit are hardly applicable in
the big data environment due to the inherent scalability and
performance issue. Secondly, the combinatorial auction itself
is a computationally hard problem. Even with assumptions
which limit bidders’ bidding behaviors (e.g., assuming single-
minded bidders [20], [31]), CA typically requires to solve
one or more NP-hard optimization problems, which leads to
infeasible generic theoretical designs [32], [33]. Consequently,
several works [34], [35] avoiding garbled circuit or oblivious
transfer remains impractical because those solutions rely on
the dynamic programming to calculate the optimum solution,
which leads to a super-polynomial run time.
To address the scalability and performance issue to deal with
the volume and velocity of the big data, we exclude the garbled
circuits and oblivious transfers in our design, and further
replace the exact optimization with the approximated one. This
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2raises another challenge: traditional mechanism designs in CA
guarantees truthful bidding to potentially maximize the social
welfare based on the assumption that the goods are allocated
optimally. Then, those mechanisms do not provide the same
guarantee in our setting because we seek for the approximated
result. Therefore, we cannot simply implement an existing
approximation algorithm in a privacy-preserving manner, and
we also need to improve existing mechanisms to preserve the
truthfulness (defined later) of the auction.
C. Veracity
Data source in the big data is almost everywhere in the world
due to the proliferation of the data collection, and most of the
data sources are not under strict quality control. Consequently,
not all data in the big data era will be credible because of
many reasons (e.g., machine factors: errors/inaccuracy/noises;
human factors: moral hazard, mistake, misbehavior). In the
CA, the veracity issue has an especially great impact because
1) the lying bidder may negatively affect the social welfare or
auctioneer’s total revenue; 2) and the winners’ payments are
calculated by the auctioneer, who is well motivated to report
a higher fake price. Obliviously (i.e., without knowing the bid
values or winners list) achieving a two-way verifiability against
both untrusted bidders and auctioneers is another challenge in
the privacy-preserving CA construction.
D. Contributions
The contribution of this work is prominent. This is the first
paper to envision the privacy-preserving auction mechanism
in the upcoming big data age, which is designed based on
the four main characteristics (variety, volume, velocity, and
veracity) of the big data, and the contributions can also be
summarized based on the 4V’s: considering the variety of
the big data, we explore privacy-preserving constructions for
one of the most general auctions, CA; we have designed a
scalable and efficient privacy-preserving algorithm to deal with
the volume and velocity; and our design also provides two-
way verifiability against malicious bidders and auctioneer to
be robust to the veracity issue in the big data.
Note that our research does not explicitly work for the
anonymity of the bidder or the auctioneer, but in fact our
work is the last step of the anonymization. Our work com-
plements the simple anonymization which replaces users’
personally identifiable information (PII) with pseudo-random
PIIs in the following sense. Such anonymization is vulnerable
to various de-anonymization attacks [36], [37] because pub-
lished attributes can be fingerprinted or co-related with other
datasets. By applying our on top of the sanitization, such de-
anonymization becomes much more challenging because the
attributes of any tuple is protected as well.
II. PRELIMINARIES & RELATED WORK
A. Backgrounds of Combinatorial Auction
Among various types of combinatorial auctions [19] [38],
we shall consider the most common type in this work, one-
stage, sealed-bid and single-sided CA (Fig. II-A). In such auc-
tions, each bidder places several bids, the auction terminates
and the results are announced (one-stage); no information
about other’s bids is released prior to the auction termination
(sealed-bid); and one auctioneer is selling several goods to
multiple bidders (single-sided).
Auctioneer
1:bids
1:bids
1:bids
1:bids
2:result
2:result 2:result
2:result
Bidder
Bidder Bidder
Bidder
Fig. 1. One-stage, sealed-bid and single-sided Combinatorial Auction
Given such a CA, its mechanism design is composed of
two parts. Firstly, winners of the auction are chosen based
on their submitted bundles and bids winner determination,
then each winner’s payment is determined by some mechanism
payment determination. Note that a winner’s payment may
not be equal to hid bid.
Winner Determination and Objective Function
The standard goal of the design is to maximize the social
welfare [20], [39], [40], which is the sum of winners’ re-
ported bids on their allocated goods. An alternative goal is
to maximize the auctioneer’s revenue, which is the sum of
winners’ payments. Maximizing the revenue is closely related
to the social welfare maximization, therefore we focus on how
to maximize the social welfare. As aforementioned finding
an allocation maximizing the social welfare is NP-hard [41],
and it has been shown that the optimal allocation can be
approximated within a factor of O(m
1
2 ) but not to a factor
of O(m
1
2−) for any  > 0 [20], [22], where m is the number
of total goods.
Payment Determination and the Truthfulness
Each bidder’s bid may not truly reflect his valuation of the
bundle. The payment is determined by all bidders’ bids, and
therefore bidders may try to report a fake valuation to decrease
their payment or win a chance to win the auction.
Definition 1. An auction is truthful if reporting a true valua-
tion is a weakly dominant strategy for every bidder, and utility
of any honest bidder is non-negative.
That is, no bidder can increase his benefit by lying no matter
other bidders lie or not. Naturally, the payment mechanism
determines whether the auction is truthful, and the one in the
famous Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA, [32]) guarantees
the truthful auction, but determining one bidder’s payment
requires finding an optimum allocation without him, which
is already shown to be NP-hard. Therefore, it is infeasible to
implement the GVA in reality, and we study the truthfulness
in conjunction with the aforementioned approximation.
A truthful mechanism for the approximated allocation is
introduced in [20]. Let L be the sorted list of bundles in the
greedy allocation (sorted by bidders’ norm b√|S| ). For any
bundle i, denote the first bundle j in L which would have
been allocated if i were denied at first as candidate of i.
3Then, i’s payment is b
′√
|S′| ·
√|S| where b′ is the bid of the
candidate bundle, S′ is the candidate bundle, and S is the
allocated bundle i. This payment guarantees the truthfulness
of the auction, which is proved later in this paper (Section
VI).
B. Privacy-preserving Combinatorial Auctions
Various approaches are proposed to achieve a private sealed-
bid auction [13]–[18], but much less attention is paid to
the combinatorial auction. In general, recently proposed ap-
proaches for the secure multi-agent combinatorial auction
can be divided into two classes: first class based on Secure
Multi-party Computation (SMC) and the other class based on
Homomorphic Encryption (HE).
To the best of our knowledge, [28], [34], [35], [42] are
the only works solving CA in a privacy-preserving manner.
[28] solves it by leveraging SMC, but as shown in Palmer’s
implementation, the solution based on SMC does not scale
well because the circuit needs to implement all if-else branches
in it in order to accept arbitrary input. Besides, [34], [35]
designed a secure multi-agent dynamic programming based
on HE, which is in turn used to design the privacy-preserving
winner determination in CA. Pan et al. [42] also designed a
combinatorial auction based on HE. However, these all target
at solving the optimum solution for the winner determination
problem, and their protocols cannot be run in polynomial time
due to the inherent hardness of the problem.
Besides, our work has one more advantage: our auction
scheme is the only one which presents a privacy-preserving
payment determination mechanism to guarantee the truthful-
ness of the auction, while all aforementioned works only
solve the winner determination problem in the combinatorial
auction.
III. PRIVACY-PRESERVING COMBINATORIAL AUCTION
MODEL
A. Auction Model
A set of m goods G = {g1, · · · , gm} are auctioned to
n bidders {B1, · · · ,Bn} in the CA, and the combinatorial
characteristic comes from each bidder Bi’s bid and valuation
on a bundle Si ⊆ G instead of each good. Bi proposes his bid
bi(Si) (i.e., maximum willingness to pay) on the bundle Si,
and the bid might be different from his true valuation vi(Si)
if he wishes to lie. A set W of winners are chosen by the
auctioneer as follows:
W = argmaxX
∑
Bi∈X
bi(Si) s.t.
⋂
Bi∈X
Si = ∅
i.e., a set of conflict-free bidders whose social welfare is
maximized, and the corresponding allocation set A∗ is A =⋃
Bi∈W Si. After the winners are chosen, each winner Bi’s
payment pi is determined by the auction mechanism based
on all bidders bids. Then, we assume a quasilinear utility for
every bidder as follows:
ui =
{
vi(Si)− pi Bi is a winner
0 Otherwise
We assume bidders are single-minded. That is, each of
them cares only about one specific set of goods, and if they
do not get the desired set, their valuation on the result is 0.
Formally, for any Bi’s desired set Si, Bi’s valuation on a set
S′ is vi if and only if Si ⊆ s′. This assumption is equivalent
to the restriction that each bidder is limited to one bid only.
Therefore, we simplify the notation vi(Si) as vi and bi(Si) as
bi hereafter.
TABLE I
FREQUENTLY USED NOTATIONS
Auctioneer A
i-th bidder Bi
Bi’s bundle Si
Bi’s bid bi
B. Adversarial Model
When the auction terminates, A is supposed to know only
the winners, their bundles and corresponding payments. Each
bidder Bi only learns whether he is the winner when the
auction terminates, and he is informed of the payment if he is
chosen as a winner. He does not learn anything about others’
bids or bundles except what implied in his payment (which is
very limited information).
The auctioneer is assumed to be curious, malicious and
ignorant. He is interested in bidders’ bids and bundles to
improve his business (called “curious”). For example, he may
try to infer bidders’ preferences and rivalry relationship based
on the bids and the bundles. The auctioneer may also report a
fake payment to the winners to illegally increase his revenue
(called “malicious”), but he is not aware of bidders’ side
information such as distribution of bid values or bidders’
preferences on goods (called “ignorant”).
Bidders are assumed to be selfish, curious and non-
cooperative. Their objective is to maximize their own utilities,
and bidders will report fake valuations if the utility is increased
by doing so (called “selfish”). On the other hand, bidders are
interested in others’ bids and bundles to improve the decision
making (called “curious”). However, they will not collude with
other bidders or the auctioneer (called “non-cooperative”).
C. Privacy Definitions
Definition 2. Given all the communication strings C during
the auction and the output of the auction Output, an adver-
sary’s advantage over the loser Bi’s bid bi is defined as
advbi = Pr[bi|C,Output← Aour(1κ)]− Pr[bi|Output← Ablack]
where Pr[bi] is the probability that a correct bi is inferred,
Aour is our algorithms in the protocol, κ is the security
parameter of them, and Ablack is a perfectly secure black-
box algorithm which only returns the final results without any
side information.
We focus on the confidentiality of auction losers’ bids in
this paper because winners’ bids can be learned from the valid
outputs of the auctions anyway (e.g., claimed bundle and the
payments).
4Definition 3. Given all the communication strings C during
the auction and the output of the auction Output, an adver-
sary’s advantage over the bidder Bi’s bundle Si is defined
as
advSi = Pr[Si|C,Output← Aour(1κ)]− Pr[Si|Output← Ablack]
where Pr[Si] is the probability that any information about Si
is inferred, and other notations are same as in Definition 2.
Informally, these advantages measure how much side in-
formation an adversary gains during our privacy-preserving
auction by measuring the increased probabilities. In other
words, they reflect how much side information is disclosed
other than what is derivable from the valid auction output.
IV. BUILDING BLOCKS
Before we introduce our auction design, we first introduce
several building blocks as well as preliminary techniques used
in our design.
A. Homomorphic Encryption
Homomorphic encryption allows specific computations to
be directly carried on ciphertexts while preserving their
decryptability. El Gamal encryption [43], GoldwasserMicali
cryptosystem [44], Benaloh cryptosystem [45] and Paillier
cryptosystem [46] are good examples, and we employ the Pail-
lier cryptosystem to implement a one-way privacy-preserving
scalar product for efficient our winner determination. The
Paillier cryptosystem as well as its homomorphic property is
shown below:
Paillier Cryptosystem
System parameter: two prime numbers p, q.
Public key: modulus n = pq and a random number g ∈ Z∗
n2
Private key: λ = LCM(p− 1, q − 1)
Encryption: c = E(m, r) = gm+nr mod n2
where r ∈ Z∗n is a random number.
Decryption: m = D(c) = L(c
λ mod n2)
L(gλ mod n2)
mod n
where L(x) = x−1
n
mod n
Self-blinding: E(m, r) · gnr′ = E(m, r + r′)
E(m1, r1) · E(m2, r2) = E(m1 +m2, r1 + r2)
E(m1) · gm2 = E(m1 +m2, r1)
}
Addition
E(m1, r1)
m2 = E(m1 ·m2, r1 ·m2)−Multiplication
B. Digital Signature
In our work, we employ a signer who is involved only
to generate a signature of each bidder’s value. Many works
can be considered [47]–[49], but we use the blinded Nyberg-
Rueppel scheme in [50] (Table), which is a blind signature
scheme. In a blind signature scheme, the signer can generate
a signature of a value m without ‘seeing’ it. In our work,
we use the mechanism design to guarantee the truthfulness
of the bidding, and use a blind signature scheme to verify
the payment is calculated correctly. Since the authenticity of
the bids are guaranteed by the truthful mechanism, we do not
need the signer to verify the authenticity of them, therefore
a blind signature scheme suffices. Notably, the recipient can
recover the message from the signature in this scheme. For the
simplicity, we denote the signature of m as Sig(m) hereafter.
Scheme 1 Blinded Nyberg-Rueppel Scheme
System parameter: a multiplicative group G ⊂ Z∗p of prime
order q and its generator g, where q is a prime factor of prime
number p.
Key Generation: signer picks a random number x ∈ Zq .
Then, he keeps x secret and publishes the public parameters
as g, gx (mod p).
Signing: signer blindly signs signee’s message m.
1: The signer randomly selects kˆ ∈ Zq and sends rˆ =
gkˆ (mod p) to the signee.
2: The signee randomly selects α ∈ Zq, β ∈ Z∗q , computes
r = mgα (mod p) and mˆ = rβ−1 (mod q) until mˆ ∈ Z∗q .
Then, he sends mˆ to the signer.
3: The signer computes sˆ = mˆx+ kˆ (mod q) and sends sˆ to
the signee.
4: The signee computes s = sˆβ + α (mod q), and the pair
(r, s) is the Nyberg-Rueppel signature for m.
Verification: check whether m = g−syrr (mod p).
Not all blind signature schemes can be used. The ones using
homomorphic encryption is often subject to this problem as
follows:
Sig(v1)v2 = EEK(v1)v2 = EEK(v1v2) = Sig(v1v2)
where ‘Sig’ stands for the signature. Then, the signature of
value v1v2 is illegally generated from the Sig(v1). In addition,
the DSA signature scheme mentioned in [50] is also subject to
forgery. Given a signature Sig(m) = (s, r) for m, an attacker
can create a fake signature Sig(km) = (ks, rk ).
C. Fixed-point Representation
Due to the cryptographic operations in our work, all the
computations and operations in our scheme are closed in
integer groups, and therefore our scheme cannot be directly
applied when the numeric type is real number.
Floating point representation ([a] = {m, e} where a ≈ 1.m·
2e) is one way to use integers to represent real numbers, but it
is hard to implement the arithmetic homomorphic operations
(addition, multiplication) on floating point representations.
Instead, we use the fixed point representation [51] to represent
real numbers due to its simplicity when applying elementary
arithmetic operations to it. Given a real number a, its fixed
point representation is given by [x] = bx · 2ec for a fixed e,
and all the arithmetic operations reduce to the integer versions
as follows:
• Addition/Subtraction: [x± y] = [x]± [y]
• Multiplication/Division : [x · y±1] = [x] · [y]±1 · 2∓e
where x ·2−1 stands for x divided by 2. Then, our protocols in
the following sections can be trivially extended to real-number
domain.
5V. DESIGNING AUCTION MECHANISM FOR BIG DATA
Before the auction proceeds, all bidders are asked to blindly
sign their ψi and Si1 via a third-party signer T . Since the
signature is blindly signed, T learns nothing. These signatures
will be used to verify the authenticity of the bids later.
A. Privacy-preserving Winner Determination
Algorithm 2 Greedy Winner Determination
1: A := ∅,W := ∅. For each Bi, computes ψi = bi√|Si| .
2: Sort the instances in the non-increasing order of norm ψi.
Denote the sorted list as L.
3: For each Bi ∈ L (in the sorted order), check whether
A ∩ Si = ∅. If true, A := A ∪ Si,W :=W ∪ Bi.
4: A∗ := A. Announce W as the winners. Finally allocated
goods are A∗.
The above approximation algorithm for the winner determi-
nation guarantees an approximation ratio of at least O(
√
m)
[20], where m is the number of total goods, and this has
been proved to be the best approximation ratio that can be
achieved [20], [22]. To guarantee each bidder’s privacy, we
cannot explicitly perform the sorting (Step 2.) because the
order of all bidders’ norms reveals excessive side information
about the losers’ bi or Si even if the norm ψi does not directly
reveal either one. Therefore, we unravel Step 2. and Step 3.
as follows. Firstly, among the encrypted bundles that can be
allocated (i.e., no overlap with already-allocated goods), find
out the one whose corresponding norm ψi is the maximum
(without revealing ψi’s value). Then, find out the winner
who owns the bundle (up to previous step, every one was
anonymous). Finally, update A correspondingly and keeps
looking for the next feasible bundle with maximum ψi. Note
that the IDs are already anonymized either via sanitization
or anonymized network such as Tor [52], therefore only the
winners’ identities are revealed to the auctioneer.
To further describe the privacy-preserving unraveled greedy
algorithm more easily, we first elaborate a sub-procedure in
it: feasibility evaluation.
Feasibility Evaluation
Given a bundle Si, whether it is feasible (i.e., does not
overlap with already-allocated goods) must be evaluated in a
privacy-preserving manner in order to keep the confidentiality
of bids or bundles. Firstly, we use an m-dimension binary
vector A represent the allocation status of all goods (i.e., the
goods in A), where the k-th bit ak = 1 if the k-th good gk is
allocated already and 0 otherwise. Similarly, we use another
vector Si to represent Bi’s bundle Si, where Si’s k-th bit si,k =
1 if gk ∈ Si and 0 otherwise.
Then, A ∩ Si = ∅ if and only if
A · Si = 0⇔
m∑
k=1
aksi,k = 0
1Si is a set, but it can be mapped to an integer with any 1-to-1 mapping
(e.g., hash).
If the scalar product is θ, that means Bi’s bundle Si includes
θ already-allocated goods. In order to keep θ and {si,k} secret
from the auctioneer, and to keep θ and {ak} secret from Bi,
we propose the following privacy-preserving scalar product to
let the auctioneer learn whether the above sum is equal to 0.
Algorithm 3 Privacy-preserving Scalar Product
1: Auc picks a pair of Paillier cryptosystem key: PK ′Auc =
(n, g), SK ′Auc = λ (Section IV).
2: Auc encrypts every bit ak homomorphically and sends
its ciphertext EAuc(ak) to the bidder Bi whose bundle is
being checked.
3: Upon receiving m ciphertexts, Bi first picks a random
number δi ∈ Zn and performs following operations:
∀k : ck = EAuc(ak)δisi,k = EAuc(δiaksi,k)
Then, he computes the following and sends to the auc-
tioneer:
c =
m∏
k=1
ck = EAuc(δi
m∑
k=1
aksi,k)
4: The auctioneer decrypts the received ciphertext using his
secret key, which is the scalar product δi · A · Si.
If δi · A · Si = 0, Auc learns Si is feasible, and if Si
is not feasible, the outcome is δiθ which is indistinguishable
to a random number in Zn from the auctioneer’s perspective
because of the randomizer δi.
Combining the above feasibility evaluation, we are ready to
present our privacy-preserving winner determination algorithm
which works as a black-box algorithm outputting the winning
bundles and the winners only (Algorithm V-A). Essentially,
the outcome of 3-b is 0 if and only if Bi’s ψi is equal to the
Auc’s guess, and c at 3-c is equal to 0 if and only if Bi’s Si is
feasible at the current allocation A. Then, the final outcome at
3-e is equal to 0 if and only if Bi’s ψi is the maximum among
all the remaining bidders and his bundle is also feasible.
Besides this, the algorithm deserves further clarifications at
the places terms or phrases are marked bold. Firstly, the way
Auc guesses the maximum norm at step 3 is critical for the
performance. Given the range of the possible values for the
norms, Auc performs a binary search until finding a value ψ∗
such that the final outcome at 3-e yields 0 at ψ∗ but not at ψ∗+
1. If such values are discovered, the next binary search can
be started from ψ∗. Secondly, given the outcome yielding 0 at
3-e, Auc must find out the winner first because every bidder is
anonymous yet up to this point. This can be done by declaring
the anonymous ID of the winner and asking him to reveal his
ψi, Si,Sig(ψi), and Sig(Si) to auctioneer for the confirmation.
Since everything was encrypted under Auc’s keys, no bidders
gain any information about the ψ∗. On the other hand, because
the entire protocol is conducted in an anonymized network,
declaring the anonymous ID does not breach winner privacy
(anonymous ID is often a one time identity). If psii = ψ∗,
Auc learns the bidder is the winner, and marks his goods as
allocated in A (the authenticity of ψi and Si can be verified
6with the signatures). Finally, Auc learns no more update is
possible when he finds out the binary search is terminated but
no one yielded 0 at 3-e.
Algorithm 4 Privacy-preserving Winner Determination
1: A := ∅,W := ∅, B = {Bi}i. Every Bi computes ψi =
bi√
|Si|
individually.
2: Auc picks a pair of Paillier cryptosystem key: PK =
(n, g), SK = λ (Section IV), and publishes PK.
3: Auc guesses the maximum ψ value ψ∗, and checks
whether there exists a bundle with ψi = ψ∗ that can
be allocated by performing the following procedure with
every bidder Bi ∈ B.
3-a: Auc sends EAuc(ψ∗) (ciphertext of ψ∗) to Bi.
3-b: Bi picks a random number δ′i ∈ Zn, then calculates:(
EAuc(ψ
∗) · EAuc(−ψi)
)δ′i
= EAuc
(
δ′i(ψ
∗ − ψi)
)
3-c: Auc sends out encrypted {ak}’s to Bi, and Bi cal-
culates c = EAuc(δi
∑
aksi,k) as in the aforementioned
scalar product calculation (Algorithm V-A).
3-d: Bi sends the following to Auc:
EAuc
(
δ′i(ψ
∗ − ψi)
)
· EAuc
(
δi
∑
aksi,k
)
= EAuc
(
δ′i(ψ
∗ − ψi) + δi
m∑
k=1
aksi,k
)
3-e: Auc decrypts it to see whether it is equal to 0.
4: Step 3 is repeated with different ψ∗ to find out the
maximum ψ∗ yielding 0 in 3-e. If an anonymous bidder’s
outcome is discovered to yield 0 in 3-e, Auc finds out the
winner, mark the corresponding goods as allocated in A,
and add Bi to W . Then, repeat 3. again with updated sets.
This is repeated until no more update is possible.
5: Set A∗ = A. Then, Auc learns W is the set of winners,
and A∗ is the finalized allocation. Then, he proceeds to
payment determination.
B. Privacy-preserving Verifiable Payment Determination
In the truthful auction mechanism mentioned in Section II,
the auctioneer determines a winner Bi’s payment as follows.
Among the bidders whose bundle would have been allocated
if Bi were not the winner (i.e., the candidate of Bi), the
auctioneer finds out the one with the maximum ψ (say ψj
of bidder Bj). Then, Bi’s payment is pi = bj√|Sj |
√|Si|.
Three parties are engaged here: auctioneer Auc, winner
Bi and Bi’s candidate Bj . The auctioneer Auc needs to
know pi without knowing Bj’s bundle or bid; the winner
Bi needs to know pi without knowing Bj’s bundle or bid,
and he should not even know who is the Bj ; and finally, the
bidder Bj does not need to know anything from this whole
process. Furthermore, both the auctioneer and the winner
should be able to verify the payment. We present the privacy-
preserving verifiable payment determination (Algorithm V-B)
which fulfills above requirements as follows.
Algorithm 5 Bi’s Verifiable Payment Determination
1: The auctioneer Auc excludes Bi from B, and finds out the
winner with (A∗ − Si) by following the same procedure
as the winner determination, where A∗ is the finally sold
goods. If Bj is the winner, then he is the candidate of Bi.
Different from the original winner determination, Bj only
reveals ψj =
bj√
|Sj |
and Sig(ψj) to the auctioneer for the
confirmation.
2: If a candidate is found, Auc calculates pi = ψj
√|Si| and
sends pi as well as the Sig(ψj) to Bi. Otherwise, Auc sets
pi as the reserve price (e.g., pre-defined minimum price)
and informs Bi that his payment is the reserve price.
3: If the payment is not the reserve price, Bi recovers ψj
from Sig(ψj), and verifies whether pi = ψj
√|Si|. If they
are not equal toe each other, he learns that the payment
is incorrect.
Since Auc uses aforementioned privacy-preserving feasi-
bility evaluation, he does not learn about Bj’s bundle, and
therefore he does not learn bj from ψj =
bj√
|Sj |
. The winner
Bi does not learn about bj due to the same reason, and he also
does not know who is Bj since he does not even communicate
with Bj . On the other hand, owing to the signature Sig(ψj)
generated by T , Auc is convinced that Bj did not report a fake
lower nˆj to harm Auc’s business, and the winner Bi believes
Auc did not tell a fake higher pi to illegally increase Auc’s
revenue.
VI. THEORETICAL PROPERTIES OF OUR PROTOCOLS
A. Truthfulness and the Payment Mechanism
The winner Bi’s payment is determined by his candidate Bj
whose bundle would be allocated if Bi were not. His payment
is pi =
bj√
|Sj |
· Si.
Theorem 1. Any honest bidder’s utility is non-negative.
Proof: vi = bi for a honest bidder Bi. If Bi is not a
winner, his utility is 0. Otherwise, his utility is
ui = vi − pi = bi − bj√|Sj | ·√|Si|
Since Bj is behind Bi in the sorted list L, Bi’s norm is greater
than Bj’s one. Then,
bi√|Si| ≥ bj√|Sj | ⇒ bi ≥ bj√|Sj | · |Si| ⇒ ui ≥ 0
Therefore, any honest bidder’s utility is non-negative.
Theorem 2. Any bidder’s utility is not increased when he bids
dishonestly.
Proof: Any bidder Bi’s utility is
ui =
{
vi − bj√|Sj | ·
√|Si| Bi is a winner
0 Otherwise
7We discuss two different cases of Bi’s valuation vi. Again, Bj
is Bi’s candidate.
Case 1: vi < bj√|Sj | ·
√|Si|
In this case, if Bi bids honestly, Bj becomes the winner,
and Bi gains 0 as his utility. This is same when he reports
a lower bid than vi, or he reports a higher bid than vi but
not high enough to beat Bj and becomes a winner. However,
if he bids dishonestly by reporting a higher bid than vi and
becomes the winner, his utility is
ui = vi − bj√|Sj | ·√|Si|
Since Bi is not a winner if bi = vi, we have:
vi√|Si| < bj√|Sj | ⇒ vi < bj√|Sj | ·
√
|Si| ⇒ ui < 0
Therefore, bidders do not gain benefit by lying in this case.
Case 2: vi ≥ bj√|Sj | ·
√|Si|
In this case, if Bi bids honestly, he is the winner and
achieves a non-negative utility (Theorem 2). This is same when
he reports a higher bid than vi, or he reports a lower bid than
vi but not low enough to lose the auction. However, if he bids
dishonestly by reporting a lower bid than vi and loses the
auction, his utility becomes 0. Therefore, bidders do not gain
benefit by lying in this cases.
In conclusion, bidders do not increase their utility by
reporting a fake valuation as bid in this payment mechanism.
Combining the Theorem 1 and 2, we can conclude that our
payment mechanism guarantees the truthfulness of the auction.
B. Privacy Analysis
Theorem 3. An adversarial auctioneer Auc’s advantage
advSi is negligible.
Proof: Every winner’s bundle Si is given to Auc, there-
fore we have:
advSi = Pr[Si|C,Output← Aour(1κ)]− Pr[Si|Output← Ablack]
= 1− 1 = 0
if Bi is a winner.
Further, it is already shown that the Paillier cryptosystem is
semantically secure [46]. Therefore, all that an adversarial Auc
learns during the feasibility evaluation (Section V) is whether
there exists a feasible bundle whose norm is ψ∗. This reveals
nothing about losers’ Si, therefore any adversary’s view on
losers’ bundles in our algorithms is same as the one in an
ideal black-box algorithm. Therefore,
advSi = Pr[Si|C,Output← Aour(1κ)]−Pr[Si|Output← Ablack] < negl(κ)
where negl(·) is a negligible function.
Theorem 4. An adversarial auctioneer’s advantage advbi is
negligible for all losers.
Proof: In the payment determination of the winner Bi,
a loser Bj’s norm ψj is disclosed to the auctioneer Auc, but
the auctioneer does not know the identity of Bj . In a black-
box algorithm, Auc gets only the output of the auction, and
he learns the same norm ψj based on Bi’s payment pi =
ψj ·
√|Si| and Bi’s bundle Si, but he does not know the
owner of the norm either, which is a perfectly identical view
as the one in our algorithms. Therefore, an adversarial Auc’s
advantage on the candidate Bj’s bid is negligible as well.
Theorem 5. An adversarial bidder Bk’s advantages advbi and
advSi are all equal to negligible for all i 6= k.
Proof: For an adversarial bidder, he does not learn side
information during our auction no matter he is a winner or not.
All he learns from our privacy-preserving auction is included
in the valid auction output Output. Therefore, his advantages
advbi = advSi < negl(κ) for all i, where negl(·) is a
negligible function.
C. Limitation of Our Construction
Our construction allows a winner to calculate the true
payment based on the signatures. This further allows the
winner to know whether the auctioneer charged more than
what he deserves. But, if the winner’s candidate reported a
fake lower norm to the auctioneer in the first place, the winner
would notice the true payment is higher than what is charged
from the auctioneer, and naturally he is very likely to keep
silent about this, and the auctioneer does not receive what he
deserves in this case. Nevertheless, we claim this is not likely
to happen due to the following reason. The candidate lost the
auction because of the winner, therefore he will unlikely report
a fake lower norm which is a favor of his rival.
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Communication Overhead
The communication overhead in terms of the data trans-
mission is depicted in the following table, where n is the
total number of bidders, κ is the security parameter being
proportional to the order of the integer group Zp and Zn used
in our scheme, |W | is the number of winners, and |ψ| is the
size (bit-length) of the norm values’ fixed-point representation.
TABLE II
COMMUNICATION COMPLEXITY
Winner Determination
Receive Send
Auctioneer O(n · |W | ·m · κ · |ψ|) O(n · |W | ·m · κ · |ψ|)
Signer O(n · κ) O(n · κ)
Per bidder O(|W | ·m · κ · |ψ|) O(|W | ·m · κ · |ψ|)
Payment Determination
Receive Send
Auctioneer O(n · |W | ·m · κ · |ψ|) O(n · |W | ·m · κ · |ψ|)
Per Winner O(κ) 0
Per Loser O(|W | ·m · κ · |ψ|) O(|W | ·m · κ · |ψ|)
B. Computation Overhead
To evaluate the computation overhead, we implemented
our privacy-preserving combinatorial auction (Section V) in
Amazon EC2 using the GMP library (gmplib.org/) based on
8C in the c3.large instance. To exclude the communication I/O
from the measurement, we generated all the communication
strings (ciphertexts) and conducted all the computation in
the local instance. Security parameter κ is chosen such that
the scheme enjoys 128-bit security, and every operation or
protocol is run 1000 times to measured the average run time.
In general, the auction is composed of the signature gener-
ation, winner determination, and payment determination part.
At each measurement (out of 1,000 times), we randomly
generated the bids and bundles for all bidders and analyzed
the overall run time one by one.
Blind Signature Generation
The signer’s run time for blindly generating one pair of
the Nyberg-Rueppel signature is 5µs (microseconds) and the
bidder’s one is 7ms on average for each value, which are both
negligible when compared to the next two.
Winner Determination & Payment Determination
Computation overhead of winner determination and pay-
ment determination is dominated by the series of homomor-
phic operations, which is shown in Figure 2 - Figure 5.
In fact, the homomorphic encryption we employed in this
paper is a very old work proposed in 1999. Recent advances in
the homomorphic encryption (e.g., [53]) allows much smaller
overhead for the homomorphic operation, and this will im-
prove the performance at least by 1,000 times.
C. Comparison with peer works
Besides the differences reviewed in Section II, we compare
scalability of ours with peer works in Table VII-C.
TABLE III
GROWTH OF COMPUTATION OVERHEAD
Variable Ours [28] [34], [35], [42]
Maximum Bid Logarithmic Logarithmic Linear
Bidder # Linear Linear Linear
Goods # Linear Exponential Exponential
Further, by comparing the actual run time of our implemen-
tation and the one in [28], one can notice that our overhead
grows with much smaller constant factors as well. Considering
that our overhead can be dramatically reduced by replacing
the old Paillier’s cryptosystem with more advanced and faster
additive homomorphic encryption, the performance advantages
over peer works is very prominent.
VIII. CONCLUSION & FUTURE DIRECTION
In this paper, we presented a privacy-preserving auction
design for the big data context where volume, velocity, variety,
and veracity may be challenging for the auction designers.
We focused on the combinatorial auction for the variety;
we achieved a much better asymptotic performance than
peer works by approximating the NP-hard problem in the
combinatorial auction for the volume and velocity; and for
the veracity issue resulted from untrusted auctioneer and
bidders, we designed an auction scheme that can guarantee
the truthfulness bidding and price verifiability. We extensively
discussed and analyzed the security of our construction to
show that any adversary’s view is same as the one in a black-
box algorithm, and our implementation also shows that it
greatly improved the asymptotic performance of peer works.
Considering the exascale computing in the big data, our work
is not perfectly suitable for any big data context. However,
we firmly believe this work is a big step towards the auction
design in the big data era.
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